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Resumen 
 
We propose a model that accounts for the potential feedback between schooling performance, human
capital accumulation and long run GDP growth, and links these results with poverty incidence. Our
simulation exercise takes into account targets for education indicators and GDP growth itself (as
arguments in our planner’s loss function) and provides two conclusions: (i) with additional funds which
amount to 1% of GDP each year, public intervention could add, by year 2015, an extra 0.89 and 1.80 
percentage points in terms of long-run GDP growth and permanent reduction in poverty incidence,
respectively; and (ii) in order to engineer an intervention in the educational sector so as to transfer
households the necessary assets to attain a larger income generation potential in the long run, we need to
extend the original set of MDG indicators to account for access to higher educational levels besides
primary.. 
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1 Introduction and motivation 
This project’s main objective is to approximate the potential impact of different scenarios 
regarding public investment in education over economic growth and poverty incidence. 
Our analysis is based on the existence of interrelations and synergies between MDG 
indicators for poverty and education achievement. In this regard, we propose a model that 
accounts for the potential feedback between schooling performance, the accumulation of 
human capital and long run GDP growth, and link these results with poverty incidence. 
Within this framework, we address the issue whether MDG indicators related to 
education should be restated for the Peruvian case in order to maximize their effect over 
economic growth and poverty reduction in the long term. 
 
In September 2000, all country members of the United Nations (UN) signed the 
Millennium Declaration, where they recognized the need to promote a multidimensional 
vision of development centered in the fulfillment of basic needs with an environmentally 
sustainable basis. Specifically, they committed to achieve, by the year 2015, a set of goals 
and targets related to the reduction of poverty, hunger, disease, mortality, illiteracy, 
environmental degradation and discrimination against women. These are known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
 
The wide range of aspects involved in the MDGs, ranging from education to environment 
and gender equality, reflects the shift towards a broadened concept of poverty (which 
includes short run poverty symptoms and long rung poverty determinants) and, the fact 
that all these issues must be taken care of simultaneously, points out the relevance of 
promoting a comprehensive approach and a coordinated strategy for reducing poverty 
around the world. 
 
Thus, MDGs can be viewed as an important step towards a consensus regarding the 
minimum set of arguments that a social planner’s loss function must include, specially 
when considering inter-temporal difficult choices between short term poverty alleviation 
and long term poverty reduction. They have contributed to the debate regarding the 
multidimensional aspects of poverty and, in terms of policy analysis and design, made 
explicit the need for a systemic approach.  
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MDG assessment has been usually conducted on a sectorial basis, estimating the future 
path of each indicator as a function of its past evolution, or via structural models that 
account for a limited set of determinants, typically taking other MDG indicators as given. 
Thus, MDG prediction and costing can be biased because of the failure to consider the 
interactions among policy interventions and indicators. 
 
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed 
description of the methodology undertaken for this study. The third section describes 
empirical results related to a simulation exercise which takes into account targets for 
education indicators or GDP growth itself (as arguments in our planner’s loss function) 
and assesses the potential impact of reaching these targets in terms of the accumulation of 
human capital, aggregate GDP growth and poverty incidence. The fourth and final section 
summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2 Methodology 
The model proposed involves four different blocks: (i) a macro block (which connects 
aggregate GDP growth with educational attainment via the accumulation of human 
capital); (ii) an education block (which involves specific functional forms relating 
educational attainment with public investment in education and household expenditure, 
based on results that stem from micro-econometric estimations using Peruvian household 
data); (iii) a poverty block (which links GDP growth and changes in the Gini coefficient 
with the incidence of monetary poverty); and (iv) a costing and resource constraint block 
(which specifies cost functions for specific policy interventions identified in (ii), and links 
these to a planner budget constraint).  
These four blocks are integrated in order to provide the system of constraints faced by the 
planner when trying to minimize her loss function. This loss function, in turn, will depend 
on the distance between exogenous targets and the level attained by education indicators 
or aggregate GDP growth at the end of the planning period (year 2015). In what follows, 
we present a detailed description of the analytical derivation of functional forms related to 
each of the four blocks involved in the aggregate model. 
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2.1 The Macro Block 
2.1.1 The general framework 
One of the main objectives of this paper is to build a model that accounts for the feedback 
between schooling performance, the accumulation of human capital and long run GDP 
growth. Following Lucas (1988), our analytical framework is based on a model where 
date t aggregate production (Yt) is given by the combination of physical (Kt) and human 
(HYt) capital via a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
 
(1 )
t t t YtY A K H
β −β
=      (1.) 
 
In the expression above, HY is the stock of human capital devoted to production (labor 
force adjusted for productivity), and this is assumed to be equal to a proportion ( Yµ ) of 
the total stock of human capital (H). The remaining proportion ( H HH H= µ ) is devoted to 
the accumulation of more human capital according to: 
 
H
H
H BH H
B H H
= − δ
= µ − δ
&
     (2.) 
 
where B is the parameter describing the technology of the educational sector (the rate at 
which human capital is transformed into more human capital) and δ  is the depreciation 
rate of human capital. Thus, human capital growth ( Hγ ) is given by: 
 
H HBγ = µ − δ      (3.) 
 
It is worth mentioning the Lucas’ model only considers one “type” of education and that 
his representative agent seeks to maximize the discounted path of consumption with 
preferences defined by a constant relative risk aversion function. There is only one 
proportion of human capital devoted to education ( Hµ ) and this is one of the control 
variables available for the optimization problem. Lucas’ steady state solution implies a 
value for Hµ  given by: 
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H 1 [(1 )( B) ] /[B ]µ = − − θ δ − + ρ θ      (4.) 
 
where θ  and ρ  refer to the risk aversion parameter and inter-temporal discount rate, 
respectively. Given this steady state solution for the proportion of human capital devoted 
to the education sector, and a balanced growth path where SS SSK Hγ = γ , GDP steady state 
growth rate is given by  SS SS SSY A Hγ = γ + γ 2. In this way, long run GDP growth depends on 
the rate of growth of technology  ( SSAγ ; which can be assumed as exogenous) and the rate 
of growth of human capital ( SSHγ ; which depends on the parameter governing the 
technology of the educational sector (B), the depreciation rate of human capital and 
parameters defining consumer preferences --the inter-temporal discount rate and risk 
aversion-). 
 
2.1.2 Our specification 
Given the above, our objective is to link long run GDP growth rate with observed 
enrollment and graduation rates in the different educational levels. In particular, these 
rates will influence the technology of the education sector (B) and affect long run GDP 
growth ( SSYγ ) via SSHγ . In turn, and if enrollment and graduation rates can be affected by 
the provision of educational services, our model will capture the planner’s potential 
ability to influence long run GDP growth by fostering the accumulation of human capital. 
 
To accomplish this, we will consider three different educational levels (primary, 
secondary and tertiary) and assume the existence of three different “types” of agent which 
face choice. The first agent, with no education, must decide between enrolling and 
finishing primary education or entering the labor market. The second agent, with 
completed primary education, must decide between enrolling and finishing secondary 
education or entering the labor force. Finally, the third “type” of agent, with completed 
secondary, must decide between enrolling and finishing the next educational cycle 
(tertiary) or entering the labor market. This defines the existence of three different stocks 
                                                
2
 Taking logs, differentiating with respect to time, and imposing SS SSK Hγ = γ  in (1.) suffices to arrive to this 
solution. 
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of human capital (H1, H2 and H3, respectively). Using a Barro-Lee (2000) type of human 
capital aggregation, we assume each stock is given by the number of individuals in each 
category (either enrolled in the corresponding educational cycle or in the labor force), 
adjusted by their corresponding productivity. Formally: 
 
1,t Y0 Y0,t H1 H1,t
2,t Y1 Y1,t H2 H2,t
3,t Y2 Y2,t H3 H3,t
H H H
H H H
H H H
= λ + λ
= λ + λ
= λ + λ
     (5.) 
 
where Yi,tH ; i 0,1,2=  correspond to the number of individuals in the labor force with no 
education, completed primary and completed secondary, respectively. Hi,tH ; i 1,2,3= , on 
the other hand, correspond to the number of individuals with no education, completed 
primary and completed secondary, respectively, that are enrolled in the corresponding 
educational cycle (primary, secondary and tertiary). Parameters Yi ; i 0,1,2λ =  and 
Hi ; i 1, 2,3λ =  define the productivity of individuals in each category. 
  
Equations in (5.) describe the way in which each “type” of agent distributes itself between 
the labor market (production sector) and the corresponding education sector. Therefore, 
and following Lucas (1988), their choice variables (proportion of each “type” of human 
capital devoted to accumulate more human capital) will be defined as: 
Hi Hi,t
Hi,t
i,t
H
, i 1,2,3.
H
λ
µ = =  
 
 
The total stock of human capital (Ht) is given by the  aggregation of human capital 
associated to each “type” of agent, plus the number of individuals with completed tertiary 
( Y3,tH ) adjusted by their corresponding productivity ( Y3λ ). We assume this fourth “type” 
of agent faces no choice and will, therefore, be in the labor market.  
 
t 1,t 2,t 3,t Y3 Y3,tH H H H H= + + + λ     (6.) 
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In order to build accumulation rules for the number of individuals in the labor force and 
enrolled in each educational cycle, let us define: 
- tE6 ≡  number of 6 year-olds in period t  
- tg1entry ≡  period t probability of enrolling in primary education at normative age  
(6 year-olds). 
- tgrdprim ≡  period t probability of graduating within the primary education cycle. 
- tgrdcont sec ≡  period t probability of enrolling in secondary education, given that the 
primary cycle has been completed. 
- tgrd sec ≡  period t probability of graduating within the secondary education cycle. 
- tgrdcont sup ≡  period t probability of enrolling in tertiary education, given that the 
secondary cycle has been completed. 
- tgrd sup ≡  period t probability of graduating within the tertiary education cycle. 
- ni ≡  number of grades within educational cycle “i”, i=prim (primary), sec 
(secondary), sup (tertiary). For simplicity, we will assume that students are evenly 
distributed among grades within each educational cycle. 
 
Given the above, the following equations define the number of individuals in the labor 
force and enrolled in each educational level. 
 
Y0,t Y0,t 1 t tH (1 )H (1 g1entry )E6−= − δ + −      (7.) 
 
where the number of individuals with no education in the labor market ( Y0,tH ) is equal to 
last period’s remaining stock (considering a depreciation rate of δ ) plus year t six year-
olds that do not enroll in primary education. Despite that the official working age in Peru 
is fourteen, this formulation not only guarantees simplicity but also accounts for the fact 
that those children who do not attend school are typically providing labor services to their 
households, specially in rural areas. 
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t 1
H1,t H1,t 1 t t
grdprim
H (1 )H (g1entry )E6
nprim
−
−
= − δ − +                        (8.) 
 
where the number of individuals with no education enrolled in primary education is equal 
to the last period’s remaining stock of children in primary school (those surviving minus 
those who graduated from primary cycle) plus period t six year-olds enrolling in primary. 
Following the assumption that students are evenly distributed among grades within each 
educational cycle, H1,t 1
H
nprim
−
 
 
 
 denotes the number of students in the last grade of primary 
education.  
 
The remaining equations in this group follow a similar logic.  
t 1
Y1,t Y1,t 1 H1,t 1 t
grdprimH H (1 ) H (1 grdcont sec )
nprim
−
− −
 
= − δ + − 
 
 
t 1 t 1
H2,t H2,t 1 H1,t 1 t
grd sec grdprimH H (1 ) H grdcont sec
n sec nprim
− −
− −
 
= − δ − +  
 
           (9.) 
t 1
Y2,t Y2,t 1 H2,t 1 t
grd secH H (1 ) H (1 grdcont sup )
n sec
−
− −
 
= − δ + − 
 
 
t 1 t 1
H3,t H3,t 1 H2,t 1 t
grd sup grd secH H (1 ) H grdcont sup
n sup n sec
− −
− −
 
= − δ − +  
 
 
t 1
Y3,t Y3,t 1 H3,t 1
grd supH H (1 ) H
n sup
−
− −
 
= − δ +  
 
 
 
If we replace (7.), (8.) and (9.) into (5.), aggregate according to (6.) and collect terms 
related to parameters that define the productivity of individuals in each category, we 
obtain:  
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t Y0 Y0,t 1 H1 H1,t 1 Y1 Y1,t 1 H2 H2,t 1 Y2 Y2,t 1 H3 H3,t 1 Y3 Y3,t 1
t 1
Y0 t H1 Y0 t Y1 H1 H1,t 1
t 1
H2 Y1 H1,t 1 t Y2 H2
H (1 )( H H H H H H H )
grdprimE6 ( )E6g1entry ( )H
nprim
grdprim( )H grdcont sec ( )H
nprim
− − − − − − −
−
−
−
−
= − δ λ + λ + λ + λ + λ + λ + λ
+λ + λ − λ + λ − λ +
+ λ − λ + λ − λ t 1H2,t 1
t 1 t 1
H3 Y2 H2,t 1 t Y3 H3 H3,t 1
grdsec
n sec
grdsec grdsup( )H grdcont sup ( )H
n sec n sup
−
−
− −
− −
+
+ λ − λ + λ − λ
                  (10.) 
 
The expression above is our version (in discrete terms) of (2.). If we subtract and divide 
both sides of (10.) by t 1H − , we finally arrive to an expression for the growth rate of 
human capital H,t t t 1 t 1(H H ) / H− −γ = − : 
 
1,t 1 2,t 1 3,t 1t
H,t Y0 H1,t 1 H1,t H2,t 1 H2,t H3,t 1 H3,t
t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1
H H HE6 B B B
H H H H
− − −
− − −
− − − −
γ = λ + µ + µ + µ − δ     (11.) 
 
where the variables that account for the technology of each educational sector (the rate at 
which human capital is transformed into more human capital) are given by: 
 
t t t 1
H1,t H1 Y0 Y1 H1
H1 H1,t 1
H1,t 1 t 1 t 1
H2,t t H2 Y1 Y2 H2
H2 H2,t 1
H2,t 1 t 1
H3,t
H3 H3,t 1
E6 g1entry grdprim1B ( ) ( )
H nprim
H grdprim grd sec1B grdcont sec ( ) ( )
H nprim n sec
H grd sec1B grd
H n sec
−
−
−
− −
−
−
−
−
 
= λ − λ + λ − λ λ   
 
= λ − λ + λ − λ λ   
=
λ
t 1
t H3 Y2 Y3 H3
grd sup
cont sup ( ) ( )
n sup
−
 
λ − λ + λ − λ 
  
        (12.)
  
 
Clearly, the variable governing the technology of each educational sector captures the 
“promise” in terms of expected increased earnings associated to progressing to the 
corresponding cycle: the marginal productivity gain times the probability of accessing 
this gain. As such, each variable Hi,tB ; i 1,2,3=  is the sum of two terms: (i) the marginal 
productivity gain associated to entering the corresponding educational cycle with respect 
to entering the labor force with the previous cycle completed ( Hi Y(i 1) ; i 1,2,3−λ − λ = ), 
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times the probability of accessing this gain; and (ii) the marginal productivity gain 
associated to entering the labor force with the corresponding cycle completed with respect 
to that associated to entering the corresponding educational cycle ( Yi Hi ; i 1, 2,3λ − λ = ), 
times the probability of accessing this gain.  
 
Since the first productivity gain applies to individuals from the previous cycle entering 
the corresponding one, the probability of accessing this gain is equal to this entry flow 
divided by the number of individuals enrolled in the corresponding educational cycle 
( Hi,t 1H ; i 1, 2,3− = ). For primary education, the entry flow equals the current number of six 
year-olds times the probability of enrolling in primary education ( t tE6 g1entry ). For 
secondary education, this entry flow equals the number of individuals that completed 
primary last year ( t 1H1,t 1
grdprimH
nprim
−
−
 ) times the contemporaneous probability of 
progressing to secondary education ( tgrdcont sec ). A similar logic applies for the entry 
flow to tertiary education. The second “type” of productivity gain, on the other hand, 
applies to all individuals enrolled in the corresponding cycle and, thus, the probability of 
accessing this gain is simply given by the proportion of individuals enrolled in the last 
year of the cycle 1 ; "i" prim,sec,sup
n _"i"
= , times the probability of graduating within 
the corresponding cycle t 1grd _"i" ;"i" prim,sec,sup− = . 
 
In order to explicitly account for the behavioral assumptions that stem from Lucas (1988) 
steady state solution, we will explain the evolution of those ratios that are a direct result 
of the choice of each “type” of agent, following: 
 
H1,t 1 H1,t H1,t 1
H2,t 2 H2,t H2,t 2
H3,t 3 H3,t H3,t 3
1 [(1 )( B ) ] /[B ]
1 [(1 )( B ) ] /[B ]
1 [(1 )( B ) ] /[B ]
µ = − − θ δ − + ρ θ
µ = − − θ δ − + ρ θ
µ = − − θ δ − + ρ θ
    (13.) 
 
Thus, by using the result provided by Lucas to solve for three different H 'sµ  (following 
expression (13.) above) we are implicitly assuming that the optimization problem is 
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solved by the three different “types” of agent described above3. In fact, each “type” of 
agent decides the proportion of its human capital that will be devoted to further human 
capital accumulation ( Hi,t ; i 1,2,3µ = ) on the basis of the expected productivity gain 
associated to the corresponding educational cycle. As explained above, this expected 
productivity gain is captured in variables Hi,tB ; i 1,2,3=  which (as a simple inspection of 
expressions given in (13.) will reveal) have a positive effect on their corresponding 
Hi,t ; i 1, 2,3µ = .  
 
Thus, and by using equations given in (11.), (12.) and (13.), our model seeks to explain 
the way in which public interventions aimed at increasing enrollment and graduation rates 
will exert a positive impact on the rate of growth of human capital. Following equations 
given in (12.), this positive impact will be engineered by increasing the expected 
productivity gain associated to each educational cycle. This, in turn, will transpire on the 
rate of growth of human capital both directly (as accounted for by the presence of 
variables Hi,tB ; i 1, 2,3=  in equation (11.)) and indirectly, by affecting agents’ decisions 
regarding the proportion of human capital devoted to further human capital accumulation 
(as accounted for in equations given in (13.)). 
 
2.2 The Education Block 
In this block our interest focuses on describing enrollment and graduation rates in the 
three cycles considered (MDG indicators related to education) as a function of public 
investment in education and GDP growth. In this way, we will be able to connect the 
“promise” in terms of expected increased earnings associated to the decision of entering 
and continuing within the education sector (captured in variables Hi,tB ; i 1, 2,3=  described 
above) with public intervention and GDP growth itself. The latter, in turn, will allow for 
feedback between education indicators and aggregate GDP growth.  
 
Our approach for this will be empirical, in the sense that we will propose functional forms 
and parameter estimates that stem, directly, from an econometric exercise. Since the aim 
                                                
3
 These choices are consistent with the conditional nature of the probabilities considered in grdcontsec and 
grdcontsup (which define the proportion of individuals who progress to the next cycle provided that they 
have finished the previous one). 
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of our analysis is to approximate the behavior of these enrollment and graduation rates 
through time, one would expect that the preferred database should explicitly include a 
time dimension. However, the availability of information typically imposes a trade-off: 
we usually encounter too few observations for a time series analysis, while household 
survey data (which substantially increases the number of observations and the variability 
of covariates through space) typically lack a panel structure. Thus, and if the scarcity of 
time series information imposes almost no degrees of freedom for estimation, the only 
practical solution is to rely on cross-sectional household surveys. Obviously, this implies 
assuming that behavioral patterns captured in year 0 cross-section will not vary 
significantly through time. 
 
Under this scenario, enrollment and graduation for a particular individual (i) with 
characteristics ( iX ) can be viewed as a discrete realization for a binary dependant 
variable ( iy 1=  if successful in enrolling or graduating; 0 otherwise). Thus, the expected 
value of this dependant variable conditioned on individual’s characteristics is the 
probability of occurrence of the event under analysis, and the specific functional form for 
this probability will be given by the type of distribution assumed for the error term. For 
example, if we assume a logistic distribution, the above will imply: 
 
( )
( )
'
i
i i i i
'
i
exp X
E y X ; Pr y 1 X ;
1 exp X
ψ
 ψ =  = ψ =   
+ ψ
   (14.) 
 
The parameters involved ( ψ ) can be estimated with cross-sectional household survey 
data, and equation (14.) can be used to approximate the probability that an individual with 
characteristics iX  will exhibit the discrete characteristic identified in the dependant 
variable ( iy ). 
 
In order to estimate the behavior of education indicators through time, and under the 
assumption that behavioral patters will remain relatively constant in this dimension, we 
can rely on the estimated values of ψ  and the functional form described in (14.) to 
predict the probability that an average individual will exhibit the characteristic under 
study in period (t). The probability associated to this “average individual” can be, in turn, 
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directly associated to the proportion of individuals who exhibit the characteristic. For this, 
we need to evaluate (14.) using the mean values (across space) of the set of determinants 
in period (t) ( tX ). In this way, and for a given set of these mean values, we will be able to 
predict the indicator’s value in period (t). 
 
( )
( )
'
t
i t t
'
t
exp X
MDG2 , t Pr y 1 X ;
1 exp X
ψ
 = = ψ = 
+ ψ
   (15.) 
 
In accordance to the objective of this block, we will evaluate the role of specific policy 
variables related to public investment in education and household per-capita expenditure 
among the set of determinants ( tX ). In particular, this last variable will allow to control 
for families’ socio-economic characteristics and to connect enrollment and graduation 
rates with GDP growth provided by the macro block (by assuming that mean household 
per-capita expenditure grows at the same rate and per-capita GDP)4. In addition, and due 
to the nature of functional forms relating these determinants to indicators, both policy 
variables and per capita expenditures will exhibit a diminishing marginal impact over the 
indicator. This is a desirable property since it reflects the fact that improvements are 
harder to achieve once the indicators have reached an acceptable level. 
 
Equations in (12.) reveal that we require functional forms and parameter estimates for six 
different rates: (i) the probability of enrolling in primary education at normative age (6 
year-olds) (g1entry); (ii) the probability of graduating within the primary education cycle 
(grdprim); (iii) the probability of enrolling in secondary education, given that the primary 
cycle has been completed (grdcontsec); (iv) the probability of graduating within the 
secondary education cycle (grdsec); (v) the probability of enrolling in tertiary education, 
given that the secondary cycle has been completed (grdcontsup); and (vi) the probability 
of graduating within the tertiary education cycle (grdsup). Following the discussion 
                                                
4
 We acknowledge that success in graduating from lower education levels can also be among the 
determinants of the probability of enrolling and graduating in higher levels and that all rates, in general, can 
also depend on other variables related to education. In this paper, however, we decided to explicitly model 
the impact of public investment in education and household per-capita expenditure due to data availability 
and to focus our attention on the feedback between educational attainment and GDP growth, without 
introducing further second round effects. Depending on data availability at the household level, the 
connection between probabilities of enrollment and graduation at higher and lower levels of education 
could be addressed in an extension to our model. 
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above, all our estimates were based on binary logit models. These were applied using 
cross-sectional information captured in the ENAHO 2003 household survey and 
administrative records. 
  
Regarding the results presented in Appendix 1, it is worth mentioning that the models that 
present better fit and more significant year-0 elasticities are those that determine the 
probability of entering the first and third educational cycle: g1entry and grdcontsup. As 
argued in Castro and Yamada (2006), this is due to the fact that initial values of these 
probabilities are low enough (0.89, 0.15, respectively) to allow sufficient variability in the 
dependant variable. Therefore, these probabilities are still in a point of the logistic 
function where proposed determinants can be effective in terms of causing changes in the 
indicator under study. 
 
As mentioned above, the variable that summarizes families’ socio-economic 
characteristics is the household per-capita expenditure level. It is highly significant and 
exhibits the largest elasticity for the probability of accessing primary and tertiary 
education. In fact, richer families will be in a better position to face the costs related to 
the decision of sending their children to school and, more importantly, of sending them to 
pursue higher education. 
 
The variable that reflects public investment in education was built using an interaction 
between the number of teachers and the number of schools per student in the 
corresponding cycle5. We proposed this variable due to the high degree of 
complementarity between physical (classrooms) and human capital (teachers) in the 
provision of educational services. The results show that this variable is significant when 
explaining the two probabilities described above, although its year-0 elasticity is below 
that associated to per-capita household expenditure. 
 
The models that explain the probability of enrolling in secondary education (grdcontsec) 
and graduating within each cycle (grdprim, grdsec and grdsup6), on the other hand, 
                                                
5
 Except for the case of grdcontsec where public intervention was captured via the number of teachers per 
student. 
6
 Table 4 in Appendix 1 presents the results of a model built to explain graduation in primary and secondary 
education (grdprim and grdsec). We were unable to obtain significant results for a model explaining 
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exhibit a lower fit and weaker elasticities. In fact, and due to the existence of decreasing 
marginal returns to intervention (captured in our logistic functions), the initial level of 
these probabilities (between 0.93 and 0.95) are sufficiently high to prevent public 
intervention from causing a large effect. 
 
At this point, we would like to stress that this work does not pretend to replace proper 
impact evaluation at the project level when assessing specific interventions in public 
education. Our intention is to shed light on the detailed mechanics involved throughout 
the full cycle of educational attainment and, with this, try to uncover the potential 
priorities to look at for policy guidance from a MDG perspective, and the aggregate cost 
for the society in embarking in an active campaign for MDG achievement in education 
and poverty reduction. 
 
2.3 The Poverty Block 
In order to account for the impact of economic growth on individuals’ income and the 
incidence of monetary poverty (MDG indicator 1), we will rely on the accounting model 
proposed in ECLAC-IPEA-UNDP (2002). According to their specification, individual (h) 
income in period (t) can be expressed as: 
 
t
h,t y h,0 0 ; t 0,..y * (1 ) ( .,1 )y y T = + γ − α + α =     (16.) 
 
where yγ  refers to the annual rate of (distribution-neutral7) per-capita GDP growth, α  is 
the percentage change in the Gini coefficient, while h,0y  and 0y  refer to year 0 income of 
individual (h) and year 0 mean income, respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
graduation in tertiary education (grdsup). Therefore, results obtained for the model presented in Table 4 
were also used to explain grdsup. 
7
 Regarding the role and nature of economic growth, the recent literature proposes several definitions 
related to the impact of growth on poverty. Less restrictive definitions suggest that we can talk about pro-
poor growth as long as we observe an improvement in the poverty indicator under analysis, even if it 
implies a deterioration in income distribution (Kraay (2003)). More restrictive definitions, on the other 
hand, propose that growth can only be regarded as pro-poor if it provokes an improvement in income 
distribution (Kakwani and Pernia (1999)). The “type” of growth implied in equation (16.) stands on an 
intermediate ground. In particular, it assumes that everyone’s income grows at the same rate so we can 
regard this “type” of growth as distribution-neutral. 
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Since our intention is to endogenize GDP growth as a function of the rate of accumulation 
of human capital, we will extend (16.) in order to allow for a different per-capita GDP 
growth each period and to accumulate the distributional implications of introducing 
changes in the Gini coefficient. Formally: 
 
h,t y,t h,t 1 t 1y * (1 ) (1 )y *+ y t 1,.. T; .* ,− − = + γ − α α  =   (17.) 
 
With the above formula, and for a given percentage change in the Gini coefficient and a 
poverty line (ycrit), it will be possible to compute poverty incidence as: 
 
tPop
1,t h,t
h 1
I 1(y * ycrit) / Pop
=
 
= <∑ 
 
    (18.) 
 
where Pop  refers to the total population as accounted for in the ENAHO 2004 household 
survey. In this way, and by using the results provided by the macro block to account for 
the evolution of aggregate GDP, our model will be able to account for the potential 
impact that improvements in educational attainment have on the income generation 
capability of the population and the incidence of monetary poverty. 
 
2.4 The Costing and Resource Constraint Block 
We present the specific functional forms of cost functions for policy interventions related 
to the education sector. We also discuss the assumptions that will govern the behavior of 
the planner’s budget constraint. 
 
In particular, micro-econometric results that stem from the education block imply the 
existence of five potential policy variables: the number of teachers in each educational 
cycle and the number of schools in primary and tertiary education. In accordance with the 
complementary nature of these variables, the total cost of intervention ( tTC ) was 
estimated as follows.  
 
 17
Intervention implies choosing a final value (in year T) for the ratios of teachers and 
schools per student in each educational level ( i,teduqual ; i 1, 2,3= ). In particular, and 
according to the results discussed in the education block, variable eduqual refers to the 
product between the number of teachers and schools per student for primary and tertiary 
education, while it only refers to the number of teachers per student for the case of 
secondary education. Once the planner has chosen these three final values, we compute 
the annual growth rate of each i,teduqual  following: ( )1/ Ti i,T i,0eduqual / eduqualγ = 8. The 
latter implies an annual growth factor for the number of teachers i( tea ),tγ  and schools 
i(sch),tγ  in each educational level, which will depend on: (i) the endogenous evolution of 
the number of students enrolled in each educational level; and (ii) a fixed assumed ratio 
between the number of teachers and schools in each educational level9. 
 
Given these endogenous growth rates, and unit costs for teachers and schools in each 
educational level, we can finally compute the total cost of intervention ( tTC ) in education 
following: 
( )
( ) ( )
t
i,t i,t i,0 i i,0 i(tea ),s i
s 0
t 1
i,t i,t i,t 1 i i,0 i(sch),s i(sch),t i
s 0
3 3
t i,t i,t
i 1 i 1
CTea Tea Tea UCTea Tea 1 UCTea
CSch Sch Sch UCSch Sch 1 UCSch
TC CTea CSch
=
−
−
=
= =
 
= − = γ − 
 
= − = γ γ −
= +
∏
∏
∑ ∑
  (19.) 
where: 
i,tCTea = Cost of additional teachers for educational level i in period t 
i,tTea = Number of teachers in educational level i in period t 
iUCTea = Unit cost per teacher in educational level i 
i,tCSch = Cost of additional schools for educational level i in period t 
                                                
8
 This implies that variable eduqual exhibits a constant growth rate throughout the simulation exercise. In 
the absence of short term shocks affecting the expenditure profile, we believe this a reasonable assumption. 
In fact, we are attempting to capture the mean evolution of additional expenditures in the education sector. 
9
 For the case of primary and tertiary education, the planner can provoke an increase in eduqual by raising 
either the number of teachers or schools. In the absence of further restrictions, the planner will typically 
choose to raise eduqual via the number of teachers since this is a less expensive input for the provision of 
educational services. Thus, during the simulation exercise we impose the restriction that the ratio of 
teachers to schools remains fixed and equal to its initial level. In this way, we guarantee that improvements 
in the provision of educational services can not be achieved by raising only one of the required inputs. 
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i,tSch = Number of schools in educational level i in period t 
iUCSch = Unit cost per school in educational level i 
 
Finally, and regarding the planner’s budget constraint, we will impose the following 
condition:  
t t
t t 1 Y,t
TC Y
Y Y (1 )
−
≤ λ
= + γ      (20.) 
 
In fact, the planner’s budget constraint implies that, each period, total intervention costs 
must be such that the fiscal deficit (equivalent to the difference in the stock of public 
debt, t t 1D D −− ) does not exceed a percentage ( λ ) of aggregate GDP, for a given interest 
rate (r) and given levels of recurrent fiscal expenditure ( tG ) and revenues ( tR ). 
 
t t 1 t 1 t t t tD D rD G TC R Y− −− = + + − ≤ λ    (21.) 
 
Moreover, and since official projections10 contemplate a sustained reduction of the fiscal 
deficit (0.3% of GDP in year 2005) and the possibility of a surplus (of around 0.5% of 
GDP) by year 2009, our simulation exercise will assume fiscal equilibrium as the average 
situation for the period 2005-2015 under a no intervention scenario. The latter implies 
that t 1 t trD G R 0− + − = , and combining this result with the expression above yields: 
 
t t 1 t tD D TC Y−− = ≤ λ     (22.) 
 
According to the current Fiscal Discipline Law 0.01λ = . Therefore, the above simply 
means that the planner has access to additional resources that amount to 1 percent of GDP 
each year to finance further intervention and comply with the fiscal rule. 
 
                                                
10
 Ministry of Finance of Peru (2006). 
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3 Education, long-run growth and poverty 
3.1 The integrated model 
As already mentioned, our intention is to build a model that accounts for the potential 
feedback between education indicators and aggregate GDP growth which will, in turn, 
lead to further improvements in education and poverty MDG indicators. Given this, 
simulations were carried out considering that our planner seeks to achieve particular 
targets for selected education indicators or GDP growth itself, subject to the budget 
constraint explained in the previous section. 
 
The macro block provided the rate of growth of human capital ( H,tγ  ) by using equations 
(11.), (12.) and (13.) explained above. In order to focus on the behavioral implications 
that stem from the use of Lucas’ steady state solution, during the simulation exercise we 
further assumed that all ratios that do not directly pertain to the choice of the three agents 
considered remain constant and equal to their year-0 values11. Parameter estimates for 
productivity  ( Yi ; i 0,1, 2,3λ =  and Hi ; i 1, 2,3λ = ) were defined in terms of market-based 
returns for each educational cycle instead of using the number of schooling years as 
originally proposed by Barro and Lee. These were estimated via a Mincer equation 
detailed in Appendix 212. Following Dancourt et al. (2004), the inter-temporal discount 
rate ( δ ) was fixed in 0.02 (2%). Risk aversion parameters ( 1 2 3, ,θ θ θ ), on the other hand, 
were calibrated to fit (following equations in (13.)) year-0 values for the proportion of 
each type human capital enrolled in the corresponding educational level, obtained from 
household survey data (ENAHO 2004)13. Finally, the rate of growth of aggregate GDP 
was computed following: Y,t A H,tγ = γ + γ , where the exogenous rate of growth of 
                                                
11
 These ratios are: E6t/Ht-1; Hi,t-1/Ht-1, i = 1,2,3; E6t/HH1,t-1; and HH(i-1),t-1/HHi,t, i = 2,3. 
12
 This paper assumes that productivity remains constant in order to focus on the implications (in terms of 
GDP growth and poverty incidence) of increasing graduation and enrollment rates, since these are the 
indicators explicitly addressed within the MDG framework. However, we believe endogenizing 
productivity could be addressed as an extension to our model by, for example, developing and estimating 
functional forms connecting returns to education to the provision of educational services. In this way, public 
intervention would not only foster human capital accumulation by increasing the probability of accessing 
productivity gains in each cycle, but also by increasing productivity gains per se. 
13
 Values obtained were 1 0.876θ = , 2 1.249θ = , 3 2.079θ = .  Since these parameters correspond to the 
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, parameter values reflect the fact that, as agents grow 
older and progress through the education sector, they are more risk-averse in the sense that they are less 
eager to substitute present for future consumption. 
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technology ( Aγ ) was obtained via the growth accounting exercise described in  
Appendix 2. 
 
The education block, on the other hand, provided the evolution of enrollment and 
graduation rates according to the functional forms described in (15.), considering:  
(i) parameter estimates given in Appendix 1; (ii) the planner’s choice for the rate of 
growth of policy variables (as described in the resource constraint block); and (iii) the rate 
of growth of per-capita GDP given by: y,t Y,t Nγ = γ − γ 14. 
 
Finally, the poverty block provided the evolution of monetary poverty incidence 
following equations (17.) and (18.) above. For this, per-capita GDP growth was computed 
as explained in the previous paragraph and we assumed no distributional changes ( 0α = ). 
 
Figure 1 highlights the main interactions and feedbacks we intend to capture. Appendix 3, 
on the other hand, provides a complete list and description of the variables considered. 
 
                                                
14
 The exogenous rate of growth of the population ( Nγ ) was set equal to 0.0135 (1.35%), following 
demographic projections for Peru. 
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Figure 1: Summary of the Model 
1. Macro Block 
 Human capital growth rate ( H,tγ ) as a function of last period’s enrolment and 
graduation rates in primary, secondary and tertiary education: t 1g1entry − , 
t 1grdcont sec − , t 1grdcont sup − , t 1grdprim − , t 1grd sec − , t 1grdsup − ). 
 Long run GDP growth rate ( Y,tγ ) as a function of human capital growth rate ( H,tγ ). 
2. Education Block 
 MDG2 achievement: enrolment and graduation 
rates in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education ( tg1entry , tgrdcont sec , tgrdcont sup , 
tgrdprim , tgrd sec , tgrdsup ) as a function of 
public investment in education (teachers and 
schools per student: teduqual ) and GDP growth 
rate ( Y,tγ ). 
3. Poverty Block 
 MDG1 achievement: poverty 
incidence ( 1,tI ) as a function of GDP 
growth rate ( Y,tγ ). 
4. Resource Constraint Block 
 Total incremental cost of intervention in education ( tTC ) as a 
function of public investment in education (teachers and 
schools per student: teduqual ). 
 Total incremental cost of intervention in education ( tTC ) 
defined as a percentage ( λ ) of aggregate GDP ( tY ) (Fiscal 
Discipline Law): t tTC Y≤ λ . 
Planner: 
 Choose public investment in education (teachers and schools 
per student: teduqual ) to minimize loss. 
 Loss given by year T (2015) enrollment rates in primary, 
secondary and tertiary education or year T (2015) GDP growth 
rate. 
First round effects 
Feedback 
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3.2 The simulation exercise 
In this section we present our simulation results15 based on the model described above. 
Our analysis is based on the comparison of five different scenarios: (i) BaU – a  
no-intervention (business as usual) scenario, where no additional fiscal effort is devoted 
to increase the provision of educational services; (ii) MDG2 – an intervention scenario 
where our planner expands the provision of educational services in order to minimize loss 
defined as a function of enrollment rates in primary education16; (iii) MDG2* – an 
intervention scenario where our planner expands the provision of educational services in 
order to minimize loss as a function of both primary and secondary enrollment rates;  
(iv) MDG2** – an intervention scenario where our planner expands the provision of 
educational services in order to minimize loss as a function of all enrollment rates17; and 
(v) MDG1 – an intervention scenario where our planner expands the provision of 
educational services in order to maximize GDP growth18. Thus, loss functions for the last 
four scenarios are given by19: 
 
T
T T
T T T
Y,T
LF _ MDG2 (1 g1entry )
LF _ MDG2* (1 g1entry ) (1 grdcont sec )
LF _ MDG2** (1 g1entry ) (1 grdcont sec ) (1 grdcont sup )
LF _ MDG1 (10 )
= −
= − + −
= − + − + −
= − γ
  (23.) 
 
If we refer to the gains in terms of increased GDP growth, it is worth noticing that the 
model captures the effects of several driving forces. In particular, the main exogenous 
determinants of our results can be grouped in two: (i) those that affect the maximum 
attainable improvement in terms of GDP growth, which, according to equations (11.), 
(12.) and (13.), will basically depend on the productivity gains associated to individuals’ 
                                                
15
 Simulations were carried out using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). 
16
 Following the indicators originally targeted as part of the second MDG.  
17
 Scenarios (iii) and (iv) introduce an extension in the set of indicators related to the second MDG in order 
to account for educational attainment in the secondary and tertiary levels. 
18
 According to our poverty block, and for a given percentage change in the Gini coefficient (captured via 
parameter α ), poverty incidence will only depend on aggregate GDP growth. Therefore, in the context of 
our model, a planner concerned about maximizing GDP growth resembles a planner concerned about 
minimizing poverty incidence. This is why this scenario, where the loss depends on GDP growth itself, is 
referred as MDG1. 
19
 Targets for enrolment rates were fixed in 1 (100%). The target for aggregate GDP growth was fixed in 
10%.  
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educational attainment ( Yi Hi, ; i 1, 2,3λ λ = ); and (ii) given (i), those that affect the 
proportion of this maximum attainable improvement that can be actually achieved under 
our BaU and intervention scenarios. Regarding the latter, the actual improvement under 
the BaU scenario will be mainly driven by the elasticity of enrollment and graduation 
rates with respect to per-capita expenditure. Given this, further improvements under the 
intervention scenarios will mainly depend on the elasticity of enrollment rates with 
respect to policy variables, the unit costs of intervention, the budget constraint, and the 
arguments included in our planner’s loss function. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 depict the evolution of the GDP growth rate and the moderate (or 
national) poverty headcount index, under each of the five scenarios considered (in 
Appendix 4 we present the evolution of each enrollment rate under these five scenarios). 
As revealed in Figure 2, the BaU scenario already predicts an increase of 0.51 percentage 
points in aggregate GDP growth if we compare year 0 (5.90%) and year 2015 (6.41%) 
values. As discussed above, this improvement depends on the elasticity of enrollment and 
graduation rates with respect to per-capita expenditure, which guarantees that enrollment 
and graduation rates do experience an improvement throughout the simulation period 
even if no specific additional policy interventions are in place. 
 
If we simulate our model under the first intervention scenario (MDG2) results reveal an 
increase of 0.57 percentage points in aggregate GDP growth if we compare year 0 and 
year 2015 values. This implies that, despite the fact that the enrollment rate in primary 
education reaches its target by year 201520, there is only a marginal gain in terms of 
increased GDP growth with respect to the no intervention scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20
 It must also be said that the probability of graduating within the primary cycle (grdprim) also reaches a 
value  very close to 1 by year 2015. These results imply that the probability of entering grade 1 and 
finishing grade 6 at normative age is also close to 100%. 
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Figure 2: GDP growth (BaU and intervention scenarios) 
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Figure 3: Poverty incidence (BaU and intervention scenarios) 
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Little further improvements are attained if we extend the set of arguments in the planner’s 
loss function to include enrollment in secondary education (MDG2*). Actually, the 
growth rate by year 2015 is as little as 0.06 percentage points above that obtained in the 
previous scenario. 
 
Under the MDG2** and the MDG1 scenarios, however, we do observe a significant 
increase with respect to the BaU scenario. In both cases, results reveal an increase of 
around 1.36 percentage points in aggregate GDP growth, which imply gains close to 0.89 
percentage points with respect to the no intervention scenario by year 2015.  
 
The main reason behind this is that under the MDG2** and MDG1 scenarios the planner 
is concerned about enrollment rates in tertiary education and, according to estimates 
provided in Appendix 2, productivity gains are substantially larger for this cycle. In fact, 
the last graph in Appendix 4 attempts to decompose the contributions to growth of each 
cycle by year 2015, as accounted for by the second, third and fourth term in equation 
(11.)21. This figure reveals that under the MDG2** and MDG1 scenarios growth is 
boosted, mainly, through an increase in the contribution of tertiary education --i.e. the 
technology of the tertiary education sector ( H3,tB ) and the proportion of human capital 
devoted to accumulate more human capital in this cycle ( H3,t 1−µ )-. 
 
To accomplish this, and given the budget constraint, the planner decides to sacrifice part 
of the resources devoted to expand educational services in primary and secondary to 
expand the provision of educational services in tertiary education. As a result, 
accomplishments in terms of enrollment rates in primary and secondary education are less 
promising under the MDG** and MDG1 scenarios, whereas the opposite occurs in terms 
of enrollment rates in tertiary education (please refer to the first three graphs in  
Appendix 4). 
 
At this point it is worth highlighting that almost no difference can be observed if we 
compare GDP growth rates under the MDG1 and MDG2** scenarios. This means that, 
given the restrictions imposed in our model, the gains in terms of increased aggregate 
                                                
21
 These terms are: 1,t 1 2,t 1 3,t 1H1,t 1 H1,t H2,t 1 H2,t H3,t 1 H3,t
t 1 t 1 t 1
H H H
B B B
H H H
− − −
− − −
− − −
µ + µ + µ . 
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growth do not depend on whether our planner is concerned about all enrollment rates per 
se, or concerned about growth (or poverty) itself. These restrictions are basically:  
(i) productivity gains associated to individuals’ educational attainment 
( Yi Hi, ; i 1, 2,3λ λ = );  (ii) the elasticity of enrollment rates in tertiary education with 
respect to policy variables related to this educational cycle; (iii) the unit costs of 
intervention22; and (iv) the budget constraint23. 
 
Although results are similar, planner’s motivations are different. In the first case 
(MDG2**) the planner is explicitly concerned about tertiary education (year 2015 
enrollment rate in this cycle is an argument in her loss function) and growth is boosted as 
a by-product. Under the MDG1 scenario, on the other hand, the planner is concerned 
about growth itself and, acknowledging that productivity gains are larger for the case of 
tertiary education, she needs to expand enrollment rates at this level as an input. 
 
Finally, a similar situation is observed if we analyze the behavior of the poverty 
headcount index. In particular, and as revealed in Figure 3, the marginal expansion in 
aggregate GDP growth gained via intervention under the MDG2 and MDG2* scenarios 
exhibit almost no effect in terms of poverty reduction with respect to the BaU scenario. A 
different situation is observed under the MDG1 and MDG2** scenarios, where the 
additional expansion in aggregate GDP growth gained via intervention provokes a further 
1.8% permanent decline in poverty by year 2015: under the BaU scenario poverty 
incidence falls from 45.7% to 21.0%; under these intervention scenarios poverty falls to a 
figure close to 19.2%24. Once again, these results are independent of our planner’s 
preferences: given the available policy instruments (human resources and infrastructure in 
every educational level), their unit costs and the budget constraint, it would be almost 
                                                
22
 According to imputed unit costs (provided by the Ministry of Education), teachers in tertiary education 
cost twice as much as those in primary or secondary education. Infrastructure (schools), on the other hand, 
costs three times as much.  
23
 The budget constraint is binding under all intervention scenarios. 
24
 It is important to stress that these results are consistent with a distribution-neutral growth. We decided to 
present our core results under this assumption since our model does not explain (endogenize) distributional 
changes due to improved educational attainment (it is an aggregate model that accounts for the effects of the 
latter on GDP growth). However, and if we follow historic trends regarding the evolution of the Gini 
coefficient, we could assume an exogenous annual growth of 1.1% for this coefficient. This implies a value 
of  -0.011 for parameter α .  Under this setting, poverty incidence would only fall down to 29% under the 
BaU scenario, thus making a stronger case for further intervention in the educational sector as discussed in 
this model. 
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equivalent in terms of its final effect on poverty to ask our planner to close the existing 
gaps in all enrollment rates or to ask her to minimize poverty. 
 
If we believe education indicators are among those targeted as MDGs because the 
accumulation of human capital is closely related to households’ long run income 
generation potential, then we should also believe that targeting education indicators is 
important to the extent in which they serve as proxies of future poverty. Our claim is that 
MDGs can serve as a basic template for the design and evaluation of social policy 
intervention because, together with the standard poverty measures, they also involve 
targets for a broader set of variables that, if attended, should grant intervention the ability 
of transferring the necessary assets to create more egalitarian opportunities of income 
generation in the future. In fact, and as argued in Yamada and Castro (2007) it should not 
be difficult to expand social assistance (such as cash or food transfers) while the economy 
is booming and observe a short run decline in poverty headcount indexes as a result of 
their combined effects. However, this improvement will only be temporary if social 
programs have failed to deliver those assets that guarantee that households can attain and 
secure a larger income generation potential25. 
 
We believe the results presented here lie at the core of this discussion. For policy 
intervention to be effectively transferring households the ability of securing a larger 
income generation potential, it should (in terms of our model and when compared to a 
BaU scenario) maximize the gain in terms of increased long run GDP growth and further 
permanent reduction in poverty incidence. Following the results discussed above, our 
simulation exercise has revealed that if we are to target education indicators so as to 
maximize this gain (given constraints), we need to extend the original set of MDGs in 
order to foster access to higher educational levels besides primary. In fact, asking our 
planner to minimize poverty (or maximize growth) using the set of policy variables 
considered in the model implies engineering intervention in the educational sector so as to 
transfer households the necessary assets to attain a larger income generation potential in 
the long run. Which enrollment rates should be considered, per se, in order to mimic this 
                                                
25
 As accounted for in Yamada and Castro (2007), the economic recovery experienced between 1991 and 
1997 was accompanied by a significant reduction in poverty incidence from 54.2% to 46.4%, while the 
moderate recession period experienced between 1998 and 2001 wiped away these achievements and 
poverty was again as high as 54.5% by the end of year 2001. 
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situation? Results discussed above show that, given restrictions, we also need to target 
enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education26. 
 
4 Conclusions 
The model developed has provided the necessary inputs to: (i) estimate the gains, in terms 
of potential increased long-run GDP growth an poverty reduction, that could stem from 
intervention leading to improvements in enrollment and graduation rates within the 
education sector; and (ii) discuss which type of educational services are to be considered 
if we seek improvements in enrollment rates per se, vs. improvements in households’ 
income generation potential, being the latter a critical element to be taken into account 
when designing intervention in the educational sector. 
 
Regarding the first of these two objectives, our simulations reveal that with additional 
funds which amount, on average, to 1% of GDP each year, expansions in the provision of 
educational services in all three levels could add, by year 2015, an extra 0.89 and 1.80 
percentage points in terms of long-run GDP growth and permanent reduction in poverty 
incidence, respectively. 
 
Regarding the second objective, our simulations reveal that in order to engineer 
intervention in the educational sector so as to transfer households the necessary assets to 
attain a larger income generation potential in the long run, we need to extend the original 
set of MDG indicators to account for access to higher educational levels besides primary. 
In fact, the gains (in terms of added GDP growth and poverty reduction) are only 
marginal if we limit ourselves to the provision of education services related to the primary 
cycle. On the other hand, if the planner is concerned about enrollment rates in all three 
cycles, final results in terms of long-run growth and poverty reduction mimic a situation 
where our planner is concerned about maximizing growth (or minimizing poverty). 
 
                                                
26
 As already mentioned, one of the key elements behind this result are estimated productivity gains 
associated to individuals’ educational attainment. In fact, results presented here assume that returns to each 
cycle are linear. It is worth mentioning that these results are confirmed if, following the more recent 
literature (Bourguignon et al, 2005), we consider that labor markets in Latin America exhibit non-linear 
returns to education. Please refer to Appendix 2 for a detailed explanation of the way in which linear and 
non-linear returns were estimated. 
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As discussed in other recent research efforts (Beltrán et al, 2004; Castro and Yamada, 
2006), and confirmed in this one, a seven percent sustained and broad-based GDP growth 
rate proves to be an important pre-condition to cut national poverty by half by year 2015. 
This paper suggests an answer to the question of whether the MDG framework could 
provide, by itself, an engine to foster such a growth rate. The answer is yes: education, 
and this assessment has revealed that, in the Peruvian case, it should be understood as 
education in all three levels.  
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Appendix 1: Econometric estimations for the education block -  
enrollment and graduation rates 
 
Table 1: Probability of enrolling in primary education at normative age (g1entry) 
 
Sample: population (6 year-olds) not enrolled in year 2002; y = 1 if enrolled in primary in year 2003. 
    
    
Prob > chi2    = 0    
Pseudo R2     = 0.1470    
Observations  = 562    
Variable Coefficient P-value Year 0 Elasticity27 
Per-capita household expenditure 0.0014735 0.000 0.2346 
Teachers per student in primary education times number of 
schools per student in primary education (provincial level) 1726.944 0.068 0.0689 
Access to adequate water services (1 if access; 0 otherwise)  1.266016 0.009 0.0431 
Constant -1.084624 0.039  
 
Table 2 : Probability of enrolling in secondary education at normative age 
(grdcontsec) 
 
Sample: 12 year-olds that were enrolled in primary and graduated in year 2002; y = 1 if enrolled in secondary 
in year 2003. 
    
    
Prob > chi2    = 0    
Pseudo R2     = 0.048    
Observations  = 782    
Variable Coefficient P-value Year 0 Elasticity 
Teachers per student in secondary education (provincial level) 10.52603 0.300 0.0085 
Place of residence (1 if urban; 0 otherwise) 0.8503937 0.0020 0.1369 
Household head educational attainment (1 if at least completed 
primary; 0 otherwise)  0.6902159 0.0300 0.1216 
Constant -0.5673254 0.443  
 
 
                                                
27
 Due to the functional form relating determinants to enrolment rates in all models, any change in the level 
of a determinant will imply a change in all elasticities comprised in the same model. In fact, and as 
explained in the main text, all determinants exhibit decreasing marginal returns. 
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Table 3 : Probability of enrolling in tertiary education at normative age 
(grdcontsup) 
 
Sample: 17 year-olds that were enrolled in secondary and graduated in year 2002; y = 1 if enrolled in tertiary 
in year 2003. 
    
    
Prob > chi2    = 0    
Pseudo R2     = 0.1217    
Observations = 444    
Variable Coefficient P-value Year 0 Elasticity 
Per-capita household expenditure 0.0002639    0.0000 0.8902 
Teachers per student in tertiary education times number of 
schools per student in tertiary education (regional level) 2.917545    0.0080 0.1161 
Gender (1 if female; 0 otherwise) 0.7491251    0.0210  
Household head educational attainment (1 if tertiary;  
0 otherwise) 0.6089362    0.1000   0.0953 
Constant -4.112534    0.0000  
 
Table 4 : Probability of graduating within primary or secondary education (grd) 
 
Sample: children between 6 and 16 years of age that in year 2002 were enrolled in some grade in primary or 
secondary; y = 1 if approved grade. 
    
    
Prob > chi2    = 0    
Pseudo R2     = 0.0450    
Observations = 24,970    
Variable Coefficient P-value Year 0 Elasticity 
Child mortality incidence (regional level)  -0.0106746   0.000 -0.0206 
Wage gap: completed primary vs. no education (regional level) 0.4393046 0.026 0.0221 
Per-capita household expenditure 0.0010663    0.200 0.0213 
Teachers per student in primary education times number of 
schools per student in primary education (provincial level) 447.3088    0.027 0.0085 
Access to adequate water services (1 if access; 0 otherwise) 0.355461    0.008 0.0075 
Access to adequate sanitation services (1 if access;  
0 otherwise) 0.3142476    0.042 0.0054 
Constant 2.290515 0.000  
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Appendix 2: Econometric estimations for the Macro block 
1. Estimating the stock of human capital when returns matter 
 
Typically, the stock of human capital is computed considering the number of individuals 
corrected by the number of completed years of schooling. In this way, a person with 
completed primary will contribute to the stock of human capital six times as much as a 
person with no education (see, for example, Barro and Lee (2000)). 
 
For the purpose of our analysis, we will instead consider the returns (in terms of increased 
earnings in the labor market) associated to each educational level. To estimate these 
returns, we relied on a Mincerian earnings equation and data contained in the ENAHO 
2004 household survey. The specific form considered for the earnings equation depended 
on whether we imposed the assumption of linearity for returns or allowed these to be non-
linear, in the sense that they depend on the educational level considered. Thus, for linear 
returns we estimated: 
 
i i i iln Y E X '= α + β + θ + ε      (2.1) 
 
where iln Y  refers to the logarithm of hourly earnings for individual “i”, iE  refers to 
schooling years for individual “i”, and iX  is a vector including relevant controls such as 
experience, gender, marital status, etc. For a given set of parameter estimates  ( ˆ ˆˆ , ,α β θ ), 
hourly earnings were predicted following: 0 ˆˆw exp( X ' )= α + θ  for no education; and 
j j
ˆ ˆ
ˆw exp( E X ' )= α + β + θ
 for educational level “j”, where jE  is the average number of 
schooling years for educational level “j” encountered in the sample. 
 
For the case of non-linear returns we estimated: 
 
6
i j j i i i
j 1
ln Y D E X '
=
= α + β + θ + µ∑             (2.2) 
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where jD  is a dummy variable that adopts the value of 1 if “j” (less than completed 
primary, primary, less than completed secondary, secondary, less than completed tertiary 
or tertiary) is the last level of education attained by individual “i”. Clearly, this 
specification allows for a different value of β  depending on the educational cycle 
considered. Hourly earnings were predicted in a similar fashion as in the case of linear 
returns: 0 ˆˆw exp( X ' )= α + θ  for no education; and j j j jˆ ˆˆw exp( D E X ' )= α + β + θ  for 
educational level “j”. 
 
Based on these results, the values of  Yiλ  and Hiλ  i 1, 2,3=  used to estimate the stock of 
human capital were computed following: j j 0w / wλ = . Results for the linear and non-
linear case are reported in the table below. Simulation results presented in the main text 
correspond to the linear case. 
 
 
Table 1: Productivity associated to each educational level 
 
Educational level
 
Linear returns Non-linear returns
 
No education Y0λ  1.0 1.0 
Less than completed primary H1λ  1.4 1.3 
Completed primary Y1λ  1.8 1.5 
Less than completed secondary H2λ  2.4 1.7 
Completed secondary Y2λ  3.1 2.0 
Less than completed tertiary H3λ  4.2 2.8 
Completed tertiary Y3λ  4.8 4.5 
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Graph 1: Linear and non-linear returns to education 
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2. Growth accounting exercise  
 
In order to provide an estimate for the rate of growth of technology ( Aγ ), we relied on an 
empirical version of (1.). Formally: 
 
Y,t K,t HY,t t(1 )γ = βγ + −β γ + ε  
 
where the residual ( tε ) accounts for the rate of growth of technology. Data for aggregate 
GDP and the stock of physical capital were obtained from the statistical series provided 
by the Peruvian Central Bank for the period 1960-2000. A time series for the stock of 
human capital devoted to production, on the other hand, was built using the estimates of 
the number of people in the labor force with each educational level provided in Carranza 
et al. (2003), and our own estimates of the productivity of each type of human capital 
( Yiλ ) as described above. Finally, growth rates for each of these variables were computed 
using the trend component of each series estimated via a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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The table below presents our results for the estimation of parameter β  and the historical 
value of Aγ  used in the simulation exercise.  
 
Table 2: Results of the growth accounting exercise 
 
Estimation of parameter beta 
R-squared    = 0.45 
   
Variable Coefficient P-value 
K,tγ  0.41 0.00 
HY,tγ  0.59 0.00 
 
Imputed growth rates for the simulation exercise 
Variable Growth rate  
Residual (A) 1.55%  
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 Appendix 3: Variable and parameter list 
Description Variable / Parameter 
Ref. 
equation 
 
  
1. Macro Block   
Exogenous variables and parameters used by this block:   
Productivity of individuals in the labor force. Yi ; i 0,1,2,3λ =  (12.) 
Productivity of individuals enrolled in the education sector. Hi ; i 1, 2,3λ =  (12.) 
Number of years (grades) in each educational cycle. nprim, nsec, nsup (12.) 
Depreciation rate. δ  (11.) 
Ratio of six-year olds with respect to the total stock of 
human capital. E6/H (11.) 
Ratio of each type of human capital with respect to the total 
stock of human capital. Hi/H; i = 1,2,3. (11.) 
Ratio of six-year olds with respect to the number of 
individuals enrolled in primary education. E6/HH1 (12.) 
Ratio of individuals enrolled in primary education with 
respect to the number of individual enrolled in secondary 
education. 
HH1/HH2 (12.) 
Ratio of individuals enrolled in secondary education with 
respect to the number of individual enrolled in tertiary 
education. 
HH2/HH3 (12.) 
Inter-temporal discount rate. δ  (13.) 
Risk aversion parameters. 1 2 3, ,θ θ θ  (13.) 
Technology growth rate. Aγ  -.- 
Endogenous variables used by this block:   
Last period’s probability of enrolling in primary education at 
normative age  (6 year-olds). t 1g1entry −  (12.) 
Last period’s probability of graduating within the primary 
education cycle. t 1grdprim −  (12.) 
Last period’s probability of enrolling in secondary 
education, given that the primary cycle has been completed. t 1grdcont sec −  (12.) 
Last period’s probability of graduating within the secondary 
education cycle. t 1grd sec −  (12.) 
Last period’s probability of enrolling in tertiary education, 
given that the secondary cycle has been completed. t 1grdcont sup −  (12.) 
Last period’s probability of graduating within the tertiary 
education cycle. t 1grdsup −  (12.) 
Endogenous variables provided by this block:   
Period t human capital growth rate. H,tγ  (11.) 
Technology of each educational sector. Hi,tB ; i 1, 2,3=  (12.) 
Proportion of human capital devoted to further human 
capital accumulation in each cycle. Hi,t ; i 1,2,3µ =  (13.) 
Period t GDP growth rate. Y,tγ  -.- 
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2. Education Block   
Exogenous variables and parameters used by this block:   
Parameters governing the impact of policy variable eduqual 
and mean per-capita household expenditure on enrollment 
and graduation rates 
ψ  (15.) 
Population growth rate Nγ  -.- 
Endogenous variables used by this block:   
Period t teachers and schools per student in each educational 
cycle i,t
eduqual ; i 1,2,3=  (15.) 
Period t GDP growth rate. Y,tγ  -.- 
Period t rate of growth of per-capita GDP y,tγ  (15.) 
Endogenous variables provided by this block:   
Period t probability of enrolling in primary education at 
normative age  (6 year-olds). tg1entry  (15.) 
Period t probability of graduating within the primary 
education cycle. tgrdprim  (15.) 
Period t probability of enrolling in secondary education, 
given that the primary cycle has been completed. tgrdcont sec  (15.) 
Period t probability of graduating within the secondary 
education cycle. tgrd sec  (15.) 
Period t probability of enrolling in tertiary education, given 
that the secondary cycle has been completed. tgrdcont sup  (15.) 
Period t probability of graduating within the tertiary 
education cycle. tgrd sup  (15.) 
3. Poverty Block   
Exogenous variables and parameters used by this block:   
Percentage change in the Gini coefficient α  (17.) 
Poverty line ycrit (18.) 
Total population Pop (18.) 
Endogenous variables used by this block:   
Period t rate of growth of per-capita GDP y,tγ  (17.) 
Endogenous variables provided by this block:   
Period t poverty incidence I1,t (18.) 
4. Costing and resource constraint block   
Exogenous variables and parameters used by this block:   
Unit costs for teachers and schools in each educational level UCTeai; UCSchi;  i =1,2,3 (19.) 
Percent of annual GDP available for investment in 
educational services λ  (20.) 
Endogenous variables used by this block:   
Period t GDP growth rate. Y,tγ  (20.) 
Endogenous variables provided by this block:   
Period t teachers and schools per student in each educational 
cycle. i,t
eduqual ; i 1,2,3=  
-.- 
Period t total cost of intervention.  tTC  
(19.) 
(20.) 
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Appendix 4: Enrollment rates under the five scenarios 
Primary education (g1entry)
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g1entry_BaU g1entry_MDG2 g1entry_MDG2*
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Secondary education (grdcontsec)
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grdcontsec_BaU grdcontsec_MDG2 grdcontsec_MDG2*
grdcontsec_MDG2** grdcontsec_MDG1
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Tertiary education (grdcontsup)
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Contributions to growth by educational cycle in year 2015
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